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Abstract 
The Energy Service Company (ESCo) business model is designed to reward 
businesses   by   satisfying   consumers’   energy   needs   at   less   cost   and   with   fewer  
carbon emissions via energy demand management and/or sustainable supply 
measures. In contrast, the revenue of the incumbent Energy Utility Company 
(EUCo) model is coupled with the sale of units of energy, which are predominantly 
sourced from fossil fuels. The latter is currently dominant in the UK. This paper 
addresses two questions. Firstly, why has the ESCo model traditionally been 
confined to niche applications?  Secondly, what role is the ESCo model likely to play 
in the transition to a low-carbon UK energy system?  To answer these, the paper 
examines the core characteristics of the ESCo model, relative to the EUCo model.  
The paper then examines how ESCos have co-evolved with the various dimensions 
of the energy system (i.e. ecosystems, institutions, user practices, technologies and 
business models) to provide insight into how ESCos might help to shape the future 
UK energy system. We suggest that institutional and technological changes within 
the UK energy system could result in a more favourable selection environment for 
ESCos, consequently enabling the ESCo model to proliferate at the expense of the 
EUCo model. 
Keywords 
x Energy Service Companies (ESCos) 
x Co-evolution 
x UK energy system 
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1 Introduction 
The UK is mandated by the 2008 Climate Change Act to achieve a 34% reduction in 
its Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050, 
compared to 1990 levels (Crown, 2008). The UK energy sector has become an 
important focus as part of this drive to deliver this transition to a low-carbon 
economy, given the significant proportion of GHG emissions that can be attributed 
to energy generation and consumption in the UK. For instance, in 2011, the energy  
supply sector (i.e. electricity generation) accounted for approximately 35% of the 
UK’s  GHG emissions in 2011 (DECC, 2013). Additionally, the residential and business 
sectors accounted for a further 29% of GHG emissions, with the vast majority of this 
attributable to fossil fuel combustion for heat and electricity.   
The CCC’s  Progress Report to Parliament indicated that whilst the UK has to date 
made some valuable progress towards decarbonising its energy sector, and the UK 
economy more broadly, there  was  a  clear  need  for  a  ‘step  change’  in its approach if 
it was to remain on track to meet its future carbon budgets (CCC, 2012). 
Consequently, a range of policy, technology and market oriented solutions are 
being sought that   are   capable   of   reducing   the  UK   energy   sector’s  GHG  emissions  
and maintaining acceptable levels of both energy security and affordability, in a bid 
to accelerate the transition toward a sustainable UK energy system.  
At present, the UK energy market is currently dominated by the Big 6 Energy 
Utilities (i.e. British Gas, E.On, EDF, nPower, Scottish Power, and Scottish and 
Southern Electric), which supply electricity to approximately 99% of British 
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domestic consumers (OFGEM, 2008) and also dominate the gas retail market. These 
companies operate under a business model that we refer to as the Energy Utility 
Company (EUCo) model, in which their revenue increases with the number of 
energy units sold. Consequently, they are mainly concerned with keeping the cost 
of their energy as low as possible in order to maximize their volume of sales 
(UKERC, 2006). This provides a disincentive for these companies to take actions to 
minimize   their   customers’   energy   consumption   (Eyre, 2008; Steinberger et al., 
2009) and in turn the GHG emissions associated with satisfying their energy needs. 
This disincentive is reflected in the tariffs most EUCos offer their customers, who 
are generally invited to pay a lower rate for any energy they consume beyond a 
predefined level of consumption (Hulme and Summers, 2009). The EUCos also 
source the majority of their energy supply from fossil fuels (REDISS, 2012), meaning 
their energy supply has a high GHG emissions content.  
In view of the EUCos’  inability to value sustainable energy supply, scholars (Munns, 
2008; Saunders et al., 2012; Szatow et al., 2012; Wüstenhagen and Boehnke, 2008), 
government/non-government institutions (COWI, 2008; IEA, 2010) and businesses 
(Company, 2011; IBM, 2010) have all identified the need to investigate alternative 
business models, which are capable of fulfilling people’s  energy needs in a more 
environmentally sustainable way. Some scholars have argued that the Energy 
Service Company (ESCo) model represents such a business model (Fawkes, 2007; 
Hansen, 2009; Marino et al., 2011; Vine, 2005), as it focuses not on the sale of units 
of energy (e.g. gas and imported electricity) but on the provision of energy services 
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(Sorrell, 2007), i.e. the physical benefit, utility or good people derive from energy 
(EU, 2006).  
In contrast to the EUCos, which provide their customers with units of delivered 
energy (e.g. gas), ESCos provide their customers with useful energy (e.g. hot water, 
coolant etc.) via energy supply contracts (ESCs) or final energy services (e.g. space 
light, space heating, motive power etc.) via energy performance contracts (EPCs)1 
(Sorrell, 2007). ESCos   normally   seek   to   fulfil   their   customers’   energy   service 
demands with lower levels of energy supply than EUCos. They typically achieve this 
by reducing their   customers’   primary   energy   consumption through the 
implementation of energy demand management measures or by providing these 
services via more efficient forms of energy generation, such as combined heat and 
power (CHP) co-generation. This should benefit both the ESCo, which receives a 
share of the value of these energy savings, and the customer, whose energy service 
demand is met at a lower cost. Subject to take-back or ‘rebound  effects’ (Sorrell, 
2009; Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008) under which more efficient provision 
stimulates additional service demand, these reductions in primary energy 
consumption translate into reductions in GHG emissions, an achievement that 
forms an integral part of their value proposition. 
The ESCo model has so far failed to become a major component of the UK energy 
sector, despite having received significant attention from both industry and 
academia, particularly over the last 10 years (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Fawkes, 2007; 
                                                     
1 A detailed description of ESCs and EPCs is provided in Section 5, below Table 2  
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Marino et al., 2011; Smith, 2007; Sorrell, 2007). It has been suggested that a 
plausible pathway for a UK low carbon energy transition could involve a significant 
role for ESCos (Foxon, 2013). This paper therefore seeks to address two questions.  
Firstly, why has the ESCo model been confined to niche applications to date?  
Secondly what role is the ESCo model likely to play in the transition to a low-carbon 
UK energy system? In order to answer these questions, the paper begins by 
examining the core characteristics of the ESCo model, relative to the EUCo model, 
using  Osterwalder  &  Pigneur’s   (2010) business model framework. The paper then 
applies a coevolutionary framework for analysing a sustainable low carbon 
transition (Foxon, 2011) to understand how ESCos have co-evolved with the wider 
UK energy system (e.g. institutions, user practices, technologies etc.), in order to 
provide insight into how ESCos might contribute to a future UK low-carbon 
transition. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the past development 
of ESCos in the UK energy system. Section 3 introduces the integrated analytical 
framework this paper applies, which draws upon two existing frameworks from 
both the business model and co-evolutionary literatures. Section 4 presents the 
methodology for the empirical study. Section 5 compares the ESCo and EUCo 
models, drawing on results from the empirical study. Section 6 analyses the past 
and present coevolution of the ESCo model with the UK energy system. Section 7 
discusses the future coevolution of the ESCo model with the UK energy system. 
Finally, Section 8 draws conclusions. 
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2  The past development of ESCos in the UK energy system 
We begin by presenting a brief history of ESCo operation in the UK to illustrate the 
extent to which the model has been adopted in the past and the current state of 
the ESCo market. 
The first ESCo to operate in the UK, known as Associated Heat Services2, was set up 
in 1966 as a subsidiary of the then publicly owned National Coal Board (Fawkes, 
2007; Iqbal, 2009). It served as a down-stream energy management business to 
which organisations could outsource the management of their boiler houses 
(Dalkia, 2012; Fawkes, 2007). This was followed by others including  the Utility 
Management Company (1980), Shell’s   EMSTAR (1982) and BP Energy (1983) 
(Fawkes, 2007). It is not particularly clear from the existing literature why or how 
ESCos emerged during this period of nationalisation. 
During this period, the UK energy system was publicly owned and a number of 
national institutions were responsible for energy generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply (Ekins, 2010). However, the formation of the Conservative 
government in 1979 heralded a period of energy market privatization during the 
1980s and energy market liberalisation during the 1990s, with a view to promoting 
competition within the newly privatized gas and electricity sector, considering that 
these sector lend themselves to the formation of natural monopolies (Ekins, 2010; 
Pearson and Watson, 2012).  
                                                     
2 Known today as Dalkia (Dalkia, 2012) 
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These periods of privatisation and market liberalisation led to the emergence of an 
entirely new constellation of energy actors in the UK, which included generators; 
transmission operators (TNOs); distribution network operators (DNOs); electricity 
suppliers and a market regulator (i.e. Ofgem) (Ekins, 2010; Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2011). It also incorporated a raft of new market legislation such as the British 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (BETTA) in 2005. These market changes led to the 
emergence of the small number of large, vertically-integrated EUCos that we see 
today  in  the  UK  (i.e.  the  ‘Big  Six’). These companies began to assume multiple actor 
roles by taking ownership of large swathes of   the   UK’s   centralised   electricity  
generation, distribution and supply capacity. Many of these actors played an 
important role in the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s where the UK quickly shifted away 
from coal to gas as its primary source of fuel for both power generation and heating 
(Pearson and Watson, 2012).  
Despite the growing dominance of the EUCos, the ESCo market for industrial energy 
users enjoyed a period of sustained growth during the 1990s, mainly due to the rise 
of industrial downsizing and outsourcing (Sorrell, 2005). This led to the emergence 
of large, new ESCos in the UK such as Enron Energy Services (Fawkes, 2007). 
However, growth began to slow down mainly in response to liberalisation, which 
had the effect of significantly reducing energy prices and thus limiting interest in 
energy efficiency measures (Bertoldi et al., 2006; Sorrell, 2005). The cheap price of 
energy has been highlighted as a key barrier to ESCo operation as it encouraged 
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consumers to focus on financial pressures associated with other commodities 
rather than energy, given that it was relatively cheap in comparison (UKERC, 2006). 
It was shortly after this period, during the 2000s, that some of the UK’s   EUCos 
began to venture into the energy services market with varying degrees of success. 
For instance, RWE Solutions was formed in 2002, which was a subsidiary of RWE 
Group  who  owns  nPower  (one  of  the  ‘Big  Six’  EUCos) (Fawkes, 2007). RWE Solutions 
was subsequently sold off by RWE in a move to focus its activities on its core 
business of electricity, gas and water (RWE Group, 2006). Additionally, EDF 
established Barkantine Heat & Power Company (BHPC) in 2000 jointly with the 
London   Borough   of   Tower   Hamlets   Council’s   Energy   Efficiency   Unit   and Defra 
(Travers and Arup, 2009). It also set up London ESCo in 2007 in partnership with the 
London Climate Change Agency (EDF, 2013; EST, 2008). Whilst BHPC now provides 
heat and electricity to 600 homes and a host of community buildings (Travers and 
Arup, 2009), London ESCo was disbanded only two years after it was established 
(Utility Week, 2009), highlighting how some of the Energy  Utilities’  forays into the 
ESCo market have fared better than others.  
In contrast, whilst the ESCo model has enjoyed limited application, the EUCo model 
has grown to dominate the UK energy market. For example, Marino et al. (2010) 
estimate the UK energy services market to be worth approximately €400 million per 
annum, whilst Fawkes (2007) estimates it to be worth between £500 and £700 
million per annum. If we compare this to Centrica (owners of British Gas), which is 
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only one of the six large EUCos in the UK, their revenue stood at £18.2 billion3 in 
2012 (Centrica, 2012a). This comparison illustrates how much larger the EUCo 
sector is compared to the ESCo sector.  
In recent years however, the prospects for ESCo market growth have improved in 
light of ‘large increases in gas and electricity prices’ and  ‘tightening environmental 
regulations’   (Sorrell, 2005 p.42), which have arisen in response to a number of 
pressing energy challenges. For example, energy security is now a major concern 
with the UK becoming a net importer of energy in 2004 (DECC, 2011c), as its North 
Sea oil and gas reserves have steadily declined. A growing reliance on energy 
imports has coincided with soaring UK energy prices, which have plunged millions 
more people into fuel poverty (DECC, 2011c). Concerns over how climate change is 
likely to affect both the UK and other countries (e.g. rising sea levels, higher 
incidence of extreme weather events etc.) have also triggered regulatory changes, 
in particular the Climate Change Act in 2008 setting stringent GHG emissions 
reduction goals and requiring five-yearly carbon budgets (HMG, 2011). To meet 
these goals and carbon budgets, the UK has introduced a number of policies to 
increase levels of low-carbon energy generation and energy efficiency (Ekins, 2010). 
In Sections 6 and 7 we analyse the extent to which these developments are helping 
                                                     
3 This includes operations of British Gas, Centrica Energy and Centrica Storage but 
not Direct Energy, their American arm. Centrica Energy do operate outside of the 
UK and so some of this revenue can be attributed to international operations. 
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to cultivate a more favourable selection environment for both incumbents and new 
entrants to adopt the ESCo business model.  
We now introduce the analytical framework this paper adopts in order to analyse 
the core characteristics of the ESCo model and the role it could potentially play in 
helping to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon UK energy system.  
3 Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework this paper employs to analyse the coevolution of ESCos 
and the UK energy system integrates two conceptually distinct frameworks, drawn 
from the business model and co-evolutionary literatures. We now briefly outline 
these two frameworks, before explaining how they have been integrated.  
3.1 Business model framework 
Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) explain   that   a   ‘business   model   describes   the  
rationale   of   how   an   organization   creates,   delivers   and   captures   value’   (p.14)   by  
fulfilling the needs or desires of its customers. A business model represents a story 
of what it is an organisation believes their customers want, how they want it, how it 
believes it should organize itself and interact with others to best meet those needs, 
and in turn, how it will generate revenue by being compensated for doing so 
(Magretta, 2002; Teece, 2010).  
Various studies on ESCos have made reference to the ESCo business model 
(Hansen, 2009; Sorrell, 2005; Steinberger et al., 2009), however none have 
attempted to identify the various aspects that make-up  an  ESCo’s  business  model 
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from this perspective. Consequently, there is a poor understanding of the core 
components of   an   ESCo’s   business model. Developing a better understanding of 
this model will enable identification of the differences between the ESCo and EUCo 
models, which play an important role in determining the ESCo   model’s level of 
uptake. Developing a detailed understanding of the characteristics of the ESCo 
business model will also enable us to gain insight into the co-evolutionary 
relationship of ESCos with the UK energy system. To characterise the ESCo business 
model, we   adopt   Osterwalder   &   Pigneur’s   (2010) 9 building blocks of a business 
model: key partners, key activities, key resources, customer value proposition, 
customer relationships, channels, customer segments, cost structure and revenue 
stream (Table 1). 
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Table 1 The 9 Building Blocks of a Business Model (adapted from Osterwalder & 
Pigneur 2010) 
Key Partners 
Network of 
suppliers and 
partners that 
make business 
model work 
Key Activities 
Most important 
things a 
company does 
to make its 
business model 
work 
Value 
Proposition 
The bundle of 
products and 
services that 
create value for 
a specific 
Customer 
Segment 
Customer 
Relationships 
Relationships a 
company 
establishes with 
its Customer 
Segments 
Customer 
Segments 
The different 
groups of 
people or 
organizations 
an enterprise 
aims to reach 
and serve 
Key Resources 
Most important 
assets required 
to make the 
business model 
work  
Channels 
How a company 
communicates 
with and reaches 
its Customer 
Segments 
Cost Structure 
All cost incurred to operate a business model 
Revenue Streams 
The money a company generates from each 
Customer Segment 
3.2 Co-evolutionary framework 
Coevolution refers to how two or more populations can causally influence each 
other’s  evolution   (Murmann, 2003; Norgaard, 1994), by affecting the fundamental 
evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention these populations are 
subject to (Murmann, 2012). These causal influences arise through three avenues: 
a) influencing the processes that introduce new variations into the population 
(Murmann, 2012); b) by altering the selection criteria, and so influencing which 
individual entities in the population are selected (Murmann, 2003); and c) by 
changing the replicative capacity of entities, and so influencing the degree of 
variation within the population and the retention of attributes from one generation 
to the next (Murmann, 2003). 
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This approach has helped to provide insight into how technological, industrial and 
economic coevolution has been responsible for shaping wide-scale, long-term 
socio-technical system change in the past (van den Bergh et al., 2006). In particular, 
it has helped to illuminate how ‘on going positive feedbacks between components 
of  evolving  systems’   (Norgaard, 1994 p.82) have led to path-dependent increasing 
returns to adoption, responsible for technological (Arthur, 1989) and institutional 
(North, 1990; Pierson, 2000) lock-in. In particular,   Unruh’s   (2000, 2002) work 
illustrates how co-evolutionary processes between technologies, institutions and 
organisations have resulted in positive feedbacks that have served to lock-in 
modern, carbon based energy systems, predicated on large-scale centralised 
electricity generation, preventing the development and take-up of alternative low-
carbon technologies. 
Here, we apply Foxon’s   (2011) coevolutionary framework for analysing a 
sustainable low carbon transition, which draws upon previous coevolutionary 
approaches. The framework borrows  from  Norgaard’s   (1994) earlier framework to 
focus attention on the two-way causal interactions between five heterogeneous 
key sub-systems, which are understood to comprise a socio-technical system: 
ecosystems, technologies, institutions, business strategies and user practices.  
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Figure 1 Coevolutionary framework (Foxon, 2011) 
 
We argue that this coevolutionary framework can help us to better understand how 
changes in energy company business strategies and models have been causally 
influenced by relevant changes in the other four sub-systems, and have in turn 
exerted influence on the evolution of these other sub-systems. As we discuss 
below, this enables us to systemically analyse the influences on the development of 
the ESCo population, i.e. firms adopting the ESCo business model, as well as the 
competition between the ESCo and EUCo business models. 
3.3 Integrated analytical framework 
To illustrate how we have integrated the business model and co-evolutionary 
frameworks together, we provide a visual representation of our analytical 
framework (Figure 2) 
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Figure 2 The coevolutionary relationship between business models and the wider 
socio-technical system (adapted from Foxon, 2011; Norgaard, 1994) 
 
In the process of integrating these two frameworks four changes have been made: 
1. Compared  to  Foxon’s  framework, the business dimension has been 
centralised as this represents our unit of analysis.  
2. In relation to the business dimension, business strategy in  Foxon’s  
framework has been replaced with business model because a business 
model  constitutes  the  realization  of  a  firm’s  business  strategy and the locus 
of established routines and behaviours that characterize firms operating 
these models (Osterwalder & Pigneur, (2010), which in turn influence other 
aspects of the system.  
3. We ‘open-up’  the  business  dimension by applying Osterwalder  &  Pigneur’s  
(2010) framework in order to help us construct a more accurate and 
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detailed representation of a business model, which is key to understanding 
how and why they are co-evolving with their wider environment. 
4. The business model dimension is split into firms adopting novel and 
incumbent business models because these are characteristically distinct 
from one another. In particular, incumbent populations tend to wield more 
economic and political power than non-incumbent or niche populations of 
firms.  
4 Empirical Methodology  
We now introduce the methodology this paper has employed in order to apply the 
analytical framework outlined in the previous section. 
We undertook an extensive review of academic, governmental, industrial and third 
sector literature relating to the theory of ESCos and energy service provision, and the 
application of this business model in the UK. From this, we identified a number of key 
energy service market stakeholders in the UK for interview, so as to provide a 
balanced account of UK ESCo operation. These included both stakeholders with 
extensive experience of ESCo management and/or working alongside ESCos, either in 
an operational (e.g. provision of financial, technical or legal expertise) or strategic 
capacity (e.g. design of ESCo related policy), and those with a broad range of 
professional backgrounds relevant to energy provision and use.  A  ‘snowball sampling’  
method was also employed, whereby initial stakeholders were asked to identify other 
potential interviewees.  
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The research scope was restricted to residential and commercial energy service 
contracts, as the baseline of current industrial energy provision is relatively 
heterogeneous, making it difficult to draw generalizations from the research. In total, 
45 semi-structured, in-depth stakeholder interviews were conducted, each lasting 
approximately 1 hour long, across 2 different phases. Phase 1 consisted of 29 
interviews, which focused on operation of the ESCo model in the UK quite broadly. 
Interviewees were invited to talk about (1) the core characteristics of the ESCo model 
and its different variants, (2) the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model, (3) the 
factors which have enabled or hindered its ability to gain traction and (4) how the 
ESCos have influenced UK energy system change. Interviewees were encouraged to 
illustrate their responses with specific examples of ESCo activity.  
Phase 2 consisted of 16 interviews, which focused on the narratives of 4 
characteristically distinct ESCos in the UK, in order to develop a case study of each. 
Here interviewees were asked similar questions to those in Phase 1 but were 
encouraged to relate their answers back to the case study ESCo in question. These 
case studies are  reported  in  the  author’s  thesis  (Hannon, 2012) and will be examined 
in a forthcoming journal publication. In both phases, thematic analysis was employed 
to make sense of the qualitative data using NVivo 8. 
Considering the size of the energy services sector, the study cannot be considered 
wholly representative. Instead, it constitutes an instrumental case study (Stake, 
2003), designed to provide insight into the coevolutionary relationship between the 
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ESCo population and the wider UK energy system, thus improving our understanding 
of how innovative business models can shape socio-technical transitions. 
5 Comparison of ESCo & EUCo Business Models 
We argue that in order to understand why the ESCo model has failed to proliferate 
to the same extent as the EUCo model within the same selection environment (i.e. 
the UK energy system), we must first build a detailed picture of various components 
that make up both of these business models in order to highlight the key 
characteristic differences between them. To accomplish this, we apply the business 
model dimension of our analytical framework (i.e. Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) 
framework) to our empirical evidence in order to identify the core characteristics of 
these two business models. The core characteristics of the EUCo model were 
populated primarily by drawing on insights from the interviews during Phase 1 of 
the empirical investigations, which included interviewees from 3 of the 6 major 
EUCos, as well as personal experience of EUCo operation in the UK. The core 
characteristics of these two models are introduced in Table 3 and are presented 
side-by-side to help highlight their characteristic differences. 
It is worth noting that whilst the business model profiles presented in Table 2 
constitute descriptions of business models that are understood to operate both 
within and outside of the UK, they have been constructed from qualitative data 
drawn from the UK energy sector. Consequently, we are sensitive to the fact that 
some of the characteristics identified could be UK-specific. We also acknowledge 
that these   profiles   constitute   something   of   an   ‘idealised   form’   of   the   companies  
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they represent and that in practice not all EUCos and  ESCos  will   ‘look   the   same’.  
This is supported by the empirical investigation this paper draws upon, which 
identified numerous different variants of the ESCo model (Hannon, 2012) 4 . 
Furthermore, variation amongst the EUCos was also identified, such as the degree 
to which they were vertically integrated. For instance, whilst some EUCos such as 
Scottish & Southern Energy and Scottish Power own both distribution and 
transmission assets, other EUCos in the UK do not (e.g. Centrica), illustrating 
different levels of vertical integration.  
Finally, we also recognise that it is possible for companies to employ aspects of the 
EUCo and ESCo models simultaneously and therefore, the distinction between 
these is not so clear-cut in reality. For instance, some EUCos’ core business is 
characterised by the EUCo model but they also undertake energy service 
contracting within separate divisions of the company (e.g. British Gas) (see Sections 
2 and 7.1.1). However, we argue that there are clear conceptual differences 
between the two business models, as illustrated in Table 3. 
                                                     
4 These ESCo variants will be the focus of a forthcoming paper 
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Table 2 Detailed account and comparison of EUCo & ESCo business models 
Business Model 
Building Blocks 
Energy Service Company (ESCo) Model  Energy Utility Company (EUCo) Model  
Customer Value 
Proposition 
 
- Fulfil energy needs at a similar or lower cost to EUCo model 
- ESCo  assumes  most  financial  and  technical  risk  of  fulfilling  customer’s  
energy needs 
- Bespoke   and   holistic   energy   solutions   that   closely   fit   the   customer’s  
needs 
- Energy needs met with fewer adverse environmental effects 
compared to EUCo model, meaning customer can enjoy more 
sustainable lifestyle, fulfil regulatory and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) obligations etc. 
- Societal benefits (e.g. alleviation of fuel poverty, climate change 
mitigation, localization of capital flows) 
- Fulfil energy needs at low cost  
- Reliable energy supply 
- Short-term contracts mean flexibility for customer 
- Little  interference  with  customer  as  they  do  not  go  ‘beyond  the  meter’  
e.g. few behavioural stipulations 
  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
21 
 
 
Target 
Customer 
- Mainly commercial (focus on public sector), with some residential and 
industrial  
- Residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural  
Customer 
Channels 
- On-line, TV, telephone, postal & door-to-door marketing, purchasing, 
metering, billing & customer feedback 
- Energy supplied via localized and often private distribution networks 
- Support via on-going customer interaction & project management  
- On-line, TV, telephone, postal & door-to-door marketing, purchasing, 
metering, billing & customer feedback 
- Energy supplied via a national transmission & distribution network 
- Support via customer service call centre, metering & billing etc. 
Customer 
Relationship 
 
- Bespoke & holistic  
- Long-term service contracts 
- Close, cooperative, candid and trusting relationship to ensure 
customer’s  and  ESCo’s  needs  are  met 
- Customer may invest in ESCo  
- Customer may manage ESCo (e.g. Community ESCo) 
- Impersonal & standardised  
- Short-term supply contracts 
- Customer responsible for managing most conversion processes (e.g. 
gas to heat via boiler) 
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Key Activities 
 
Energy Supply Contracts (ESCs) & Energy Performance Contracts 
(EPCs)5 
- Typically finance, design, build, operate and maintain small to medium 
scale demand management & low carbon supply energy projects 
- EUCos typically engage in energy generation and supply. They may 
also engage in distribution and transmission but this is less common: 
Generation - Finance, design, build, operate and maintain large-scale, 
centralised energy generation & distribution infrastructure 
Supply - Electricity trading and metering & billing of energy supply. 
Rarely   go   ‘beyond   the   meter’.   Some   installation   &   maintenance   of  
small-scale conversion and control technologies (e.g. central heating)  
Distribution & Transmission - Within their vertically integrated 
organisation, some EUCos may engage in transmission and distribution 
via arms-length transmission and distribution network operators (i.e. 
TNOs & DNOs) 
ESCs  
- Energy generation, distribution, supply, metering and billing  
EPCs  
- Preliminary and investment grade auditing 
- Measurement and verification of energy savings  
Key Resources 
 
ESCs & EPCs 
- Financial resources and technical, financial and legal expertise to 
- Financial resources and technical, financial and legal expertise to 
develop large-scale, centralised generation and distribution 
                                                     
5 A detailed description of both ESCs & EPCs provided below this table 
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develop small to medium scale demand management and low-carbon 
supply energy projects.  
- Customer facing services i.e. operation and maintenance, billing etc. 
infrastructure 
- Customer facing services i.e. nationwide metering, billing and 
customer service network 
- Fossil fuels (e.g. gas, coal) 
- Centralised generation & distribution technologies  
ESCs 
- Technology: Decentralised, primary conversion technologies (i.e. 
generation) & distribution technologies 
- Fuel 
EPCs  
- Technology: Secondary conversion equipment and building controls 
Key 
Partnerships 
 
- Financial Institutions & Investors 
- Technical, Legal & Financial Consultancies 
- Property Developers 
- Sub-Contractors  
- Local Authorities 
- Financial Institutions & Investors 
- Electrical Power Generation Companies  
- Transmission & Distribution Network Operators  
- Gas & Electricity Network Regulators 
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Revenue 
Streams 
 
ESCs & EPCs 
- Bank finance 
- Capital grants  
- Customer investment 
- Bank finance 
- Sale of metered units of delivered energy (e.g. gas, imported 
electricity) 
- Low-carbon financial incentives (e.g. Renewables Obligation 
Certificates) 
- Trading of surplus electricity on the market 
ESCs  
- Customer payment for useful energy streams (e.g. hot water). 
Customer covers this cost in part via energy savings ESCo achieves 
through efficiency gains or utilisation of cheaper primary energy input 
- Low-carbon financial incentives for micro-generation (e.g. FiT, RHI)  
EPCs 
- Payment for predefined quality & quantity of final energy services 
(e.g. light). Customer covers this via energy savings the ESCo achieves 
through efficiency gains 
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Cost Structure 
 
EPCs & ESCs 
- Staff and contractors to implement projects 
- Marketing and communication 
- Operation & maintenance of infrastructure 
- Finance or investment repayments   
- Technical, financial and legal consultancy 
- Similar costs to ESCos barring costs specific to EPCs  
ESCs  
- Acquiring the rights from gatekeeper organisations provide ESCs (e.g. 
property developer) 
- Metering & billing 
- Generation technology and/or wholesale purchase of energy 
- Fuel 
- Premises & land acquisition for generation 
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EPCs  
- Measurement & Verification of savings 
- Compensation for poor missing energy performance targets 
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As Table 2 illustrates, our empirical investigation identified that there exists a 
number of important characteristic differences between the incumbent EUCo 
(EUCo) business model and the ESCo model in the UK. Broadly, the ESCo business 
model revolves around the provision of energy services as part of bespoke, value-
added, long-term contracts (Sorrell, 2007), which require a close and open 
relationship with the customer. The key activities of an ESCo typically include the 
financing, design, building, operation and maintenance of small to medium scale 
demand management and/or low-carbon energy supply projects, as part of either 
energy supply contracts and energy performance contracts (Fawkes, 2007; Hansen, 
2009; Sorrell, 2007).  
Under an energy supply contract (ESC), an ESCo provides useful energy streams to 
its customers, such as hot water, coolant and electricity. Here the customer is 
usually charged per unit of useful energy (Sorrell, 2007) or a fixed price for the 
supply of a pre-determined level of energy service (Marino et al., 2011). Energy 
performance contracting (EPC) involves the provision of final energy services (e.g. 
space lighting, space heating, motive power). The control an ESCo possesses as part 
of an EPC, over the conversion, control and distribution technologies required to 
satisfy   its   customer’s   energy   needs,   enables   it   to   provide   certain   guarantees  
relating to the standard of energy service it provides, such as lighting levels, room 
temperature or humidity (EU, 2006; Sorrell, 2007).   
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
28 
 
 
In contrast, the EUCo model focuses on low-cost provision of gas and electricity via 
centralised energy generation and supply to customers via standardized short-term 
contracts with limited customer engagement6: 
‘Their business model has been said to be, purchase as low as you can and 
cost as low as you can, and have a call centre. That is what an energy 
supplier   is.   They   send   out   bills,   that's   pretty  much  what   they   do’   (Energy  
Efficiency Expert) 
The starkest difference between the two models exists between EUCos and ESCos 
offering EPCs7. Under the EUCo model, revenue   is   coupled   with   the   customer’s  
energy consumption, whilst for an ESCo offering an EPC, revenue is decoupled from 
the customer’s consumption because the firm draws their revenue from the savings 
they   achieve   on   their   customer’s   energy   bill.   Consequently, whilst ESCos offering 
                                                     
6 EUCos have traditionally sourced their electricity supply from high-carbon, finite 
fossil fuels (e.g. gas) but they could generate electricity from renewable energy 
sources (e.g. wind). As such, the EUCo model could operate as a more sustainable 
business model, as illustrated by the case of Good Energy in the UK 
7 The business model of ESCos offering ESCs depends on the terms of the supply 
contract, as discussed above. If the customer is charged per unit of useful energy 
then the ESCo has an incentive to maximise the supply of useful energy, but if it is a 
fixed price for a given level of energy service, then the ESCo still has the incentive to 
minimise the physical supply needed to provide that level of service.  
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EPCs are intrinsically incentivised to reduce the amount of energy required to 
satisfy their customers’  energy  needs, EUCos are not. Assuming that some or all of 
the   consumer’s   energy   supply   is   sourced   from   fossil   fuels,   ESCos   are   also  
intrinsically incentivised to reduce the GHG emissions associated with satisfying 
their  customer’s  demand, unlike EUCos. 
Another key difference is that ESCos typically have a closer relationship with their 
customers than the EUCos as they offer bespoke and holistic energy solutions, as 
part of long-term contracts. In contrast, the EUCos have a more distant, 
standardized relationship with their customers. 
The ESCo & EUCo models also differ in terms of their level of vertical integration 
(i.e. the bundling of assets together across the energy supply chain). Whilst the 
EUCos in the UK do to some extent exhibit differentiated levels of vertical 
integration in the UK8, vertical integration is considered to represent an integral 
part of the EUCo model, given the benefits associated with the economics of scale 
(e.g. lower transaction costs). In comparison, ESCos providing EPCs typically operate 
‘beyond  the  meter’  and  focus largely on supply, and so are not vertically integrated.  
In contrast, ESCos offering ESCs exhibit a level of vertical integration, especially 
those who own, operate and maintain CHP district heat networks, from which they 
supply their customers with heat and electricity. However, vertical integration in 
                                                     
8 For example, Scottish Southern Energy & Scottish Power own both distribution 
and transmission assets, whilst other EUCos in the UK do not, such as Centrica 
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this context is typically at a much smaller scale (e.g. city-level) compared to the 
EUCos who operate at the national level. Consequently, the EUCos can enjoy 
significantly larger economies of scale. However, by operating at a smaller scale, 
ESCos can enjoy alternative cost savings such as reduced electrical losses because 
the electricity is generated close to the point of use (Carbon Trust, 2010) and lower 
energy infrastructure overheads (e.g. deployment, operation and maintenance) 
because less extensive infrastructure is required to supply their customer base 
(Brent and Sweet, 2007). 
One similarity between the two models is that they both provide electricity as a 
useful energy stream. However, they differ in terms of how they provide this to 
their customers: ESCos typically engage in decentralised generation, often in the 
form of district energy or micro-generation, whilst EUCos typically engage in 
centralised generation.  
The features of the ESCo model should, in principle, form an attractive package for 
a range of different customers, particularly when compared to the EUCo model, 
given the emphasis on low energy costs, bespoke energy solutions and wider 
societal benefits. However, as we discuss in Section 6, a number of key barriers 
have limited its uptake, which we argue can to some extent be attributed to 
coevolutionary processes.  
6 Co-evolution of the ESCo business model with the UK energy system 
We now apply the coevolutionary framework (Foxon, 2011) to analyse the two-way 
coevolutionary interactions between the ESCo business model and the various key 
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dimensions of the UK energy system (i.e. business models and ecosystems, 
institutions, technologies and user practices relationships) and discuss how these 
interactions are influencing the competition between the incumbent EUCo model and 
the niche ESCo model. These interactions are illustrated using relevant quotations 
from interviewees9.  
6.1 Evolution of the ESCo population 
As described briefly in Section 2, the population of business models within the UK 
energy system currently remains dominated by the EUCo Company (EUCo) model, 
with the ESCo model enjoying only niche level application, mainly being used for 
providing energy services to a small number of energy-intensive industrial energy 
users. As we have set out in Table 3 in Section 5, the attributes of the EUCo and 
ESCo business models are quite distinct, and so we can analyse these as separate 
groups. As the model is mature, the EUCo population exhibits relatively little 
internal variation. However, as the ESCo model is less mature, the ESCo population 
exhibits a significant degree of characteristic variation, 
“Everybody does everything slightly differently. You have got in the truest 
sense, the traditional [ESCo] model but in reality, it operates in different 
ways with different people” (EUCo manager) 
                                                     
9 Every effort has been made to include as many quotes as possible to support the 
analysis. A more detailed, systematic analysis of these interviews can be found in 
the  author’s  PhD  thesis  (Hannon, 2012) 
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Although it is not the purpose of this paper to explore these variants or the reasons 
why they exist in detail, we briefly outline how and why this degree of variation 
exists. Our empirical evidence indicates that ESCos in the UK predominantly vary 
with respect to following characteristics: 
x Sector (private, public, third) 
x Ownership (wholly owned, joint-venture, shareholders) 
x Organisational form (Public limited company, Charity, Community interest 
company) 
x Contract types (ESC, EPC) 
x Core objectives (profit, carbon reduction, fuel poverty alleviation etc.) 
x Size 
x Wealth (i.e. level of profit and financial reserves) 
This variation is due to the flexibility of the ESCo business model, through its focus on 
bespoke contracting, and a lack of energy service market regulation, providing few 
constraints or incentives that would encourage standardization and discourage 
business model experimentation:  
“There isn't a standard at the moment…Every scheme seems to be different at 
the moment…At the moment it is quite new and quite fluid. Therefore people 
are making it up as they go along” (EUCo manager). 
However, the fact that energy service contracts last for many years has constrained 
variation, since the ESCo and its customers are contractually locked into a particular 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
33 
 
 
type of service agreement for a long period of time. Variation may also be inhibited 
by the risks to firms associated with being the first to experiment with a new 
configuration of an ESCo model. 
Business models are selected on the basis of the perceived value they generate for 
both the providing firm and the customer. As we discuss below, the selection 
environment for business models is strongly influenced by the other populations 
within the UK energy system. 
Retention of business models refers  to  the  model’s  characteristics being passed on 
to future generations of organisations in the UK energy system via replication 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Whilst the EUCo model only changes incrementally, the 
bespoke nature of the ESCo model means that it is not particularly easy to replicate. 
This is compounded by the lack of nationally recognised standardized energy 
service contracts, by either government or trade associations. Recently however, 
local energy service contract procurement frameworks such as RE:FIT 10  have 
improved the ESCo model’s   prospects   of   retention by introducing, for example, 
standardised energy service contracts. 
                                                     
10 RE:FIT is a cost neutral, procurement framework led by the London Development 
Agency (LDA) that enables public sector bodies to sign EPCs with reduced 
procurement times and costs. It also provides on-going support during the process 
(LDA, 2011) 
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6.2 Coevolutionary interactions 
6.2.1 ESCos and Ecosystems 
The   ecosystem   dimension’s   causal   influence   on   the   wider   UK   energy   system   is 
largely mediated through the other dimensions of the UK energy system, such as 
institutions. For instance, over the last 30 years, the UK has relied heavily on the 
extraction of oil and gas from its North Sea reserves to satisfy its energy needs. 
However, these reserves have gradually dwindled, with the UK becoming a net 
importer of energy in 2004 (DECC, 2011c), which has been acknowledged as a 
threat   to   the   UK’s   energy   security   (DECC and OFGEM, 2011). Additionally, 
extraction and combustion of fossil fuels has resulted in a number of adverse 
environmental effects, namely climate change, air pollution, disposal of solid waste, 
destruction of natural habitat etc. These ecosystem related developments have 
placed pressure on UK energy system stakeholders to implement energy solutions 
capable   of   not   only   improving   the   UK’s   energy   security but also conserving the 
natural environment, consequently adding momentum to the pursuit of developing 
and implementing business models capable of delivering such solutions in a manner 
that is attractive to both suppliers and consumers: 
“It just isn't sustainable. Gas and oil are going to run out...It is about 
[re]positioning [our business] now” (Senior EUCo Manager) 
No major ecosystem change can yet be attributed to ESCo activity, however it is 
likely that existing ESCos  have  alleviated  the  UK’s  reliance  on  fossil   fuels  to  a  very  
small extent, resulting in not only a small reduction in levels of fossil fuel related 
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pollution (e.g. sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides etc.) but also UK GHG emissions. For 
example, Cofely indicate that their district heat schemes deliver approximately 
65,000 tonnes of CO2 savings per annum (Cofely, 2011). 
6.2.2 ESCos and Institutions 
New regulations and support schemes that either require or incentivise 
organisations to engage in sustainable energy supply and demand side 
management solutions has helped to improve the business case of ESCos. These 
policies include financial incentives (e.g. Feed-in Tariffs (FiT), Renewable Heat 
Incentive), capital grant schemes (e.g. Local Energy Assessment Fund), finance 
schemes (e.g. Green Deal, Salix11) and low-carbon obligations (e.g. Low-Carbon 
Building Regulations, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, CERT). One of the most 
important regulatory developments for ESCos has been the introduction of financial 
incentives (e.g. FiT) in place of many of the capital grant schemes (e.g.  Low Carbon 
Buildings Programme). This provides a revenue stream rather than upfront capital 
grants, thus providing ESCos with the opportunity to deliver sustainable energy 
measures by taking responsibility for the associated upfront capital costs and 
subsequently, capturing these incentives as additional revenue streams.  
                                                     
11 Salix is a not for profit, independent social enterprise that provides funding to 
public sector organisations, via loans and grants, for proven technologies which are 
cost effective in reducing GHG emissions (SALIX, 2012) 
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The emergence of this new institutional framework, designed to promote 
sustainable energy solutions, has helped to provide ESCos, as well as their partners 
and customers, with greater certainty that there is a significant national 
commitment to a low-carbon transition and that this commitment will last. This has 
helped to attract investment and encourage employers to develop the skills 
necessary to take advantage of this new market opportunity, a lack of which had 
been cited as a barrier to market development. However, many interviewees felt 
the   framework  wasn’t   robust  enough   in   light  of   swift  and  unexpected  changes   to  
the regulatory framework, such as the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) cuts that came into effect 
in 2012, where the generation tariff for retrofit PV ≤ 4kW fell from 43.3p (prior to 
2nd March 2012) to 16p (from 1st August 2012) (Feed-In Tariffs Ltd, 2012), a 
reduction of over 50%. Interviewees complained that they lacked clarity relating to 
how the regulatory framework would develop in the future, undermining their 
ability to make informed decisions as to whether or not their energy service 
projects would be financially viable. 
Other interviewees complained that this framework had not gone far enough to 
support sustainable energy supply and demand management projects, citing the 
lack of a mandatory GHG reduction target for cities and a law  similar  to  Denmark’s  
1979 Heat Supply Law12, as  examples  of  the  framework’s  deficiencies.  In addition to 
this, some interviewees explained that the complexity of the regulatory framework 
                                                     
12 Provides Danish local authorities the power to mandate that new and existing 
buildings connect to public heat supply (DEA, 2005) 
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made it difficult for them and others navigate and utilise the various supportive 
regulatory mechanisms available.  
Not all recent regulatory developments have helped to improve the selection 
environment for ESCos. For example, under Ofgem’s  recent  provision for third party 
access to private wire gas and electricity networks, in reaction to a change in 
European law following the Citiworks case13 in Germany, customers now have the 
option to switch energy suppliers and thus avoid being subject to a monopoly 
(OFGEM, 2011). Although this is likely to promote fairer competition, it will also 
reduce  confidence in the number of customers a supplier will be able to supply via 
private wire, thus undermining actors’  ability to predict how commercially viable an 
ESCo’s  energy  supply  project will be.  
Existing non-energy regulation has also served to undermine ESCo growth. For 
example, the Landlord & Tenant Act has brought into question the legitimacy of 
landlords transferring their responsibility to provide their tenants with energy to a 
third  party,  such  as  an  ESCo.  It  also  casts  doubt  on  the  ESCo’s  legal  right  to  generate  
profit from doing so, as the law requires landlords to pass on such services at cost 
price. Another example relates to the European Union Directives that govern the 
public sector procurement process for products and services for countries in the 
                                                     
13  Citiworks, a German utility company, sued Leipzig Airport for breach of 
competition laws because it held a monopoly over energy supply on an on-site 
private wire scheme (CHPA, 2011) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
38 
 
 
EU. This was cited as a key inhibiting factor because it has made the process of 
procuring energy service contracts extremely time and resource (i.e. cost, expertise 
etc.) intensive, an important reason why RE:FIT has been established (Section 6.1). 
Institutions also   encompass   the   ‘rules   of   the   game’   of the financial sector. The 
emergence of a low-carbon regulatory framework has improved ESCos’  prospects  
of securing finance, as it has provided investors (e.g. banks, pension funds etc.) with 
greater confidence in the projected rate of return they might expect from ESCo 
projects. However, many investors were perceived to be unfamiliar with the ESCo 
model, meaning that many of them have not sought out opportunities to support 
ESCos or have been sceptical of those opportunities that have presented 
themselves. This has led many financial institutions to continue to support the 
larger, more lucrative centralised energy projects they have traditionally financed, 
thus channelling valuable financial resources away from ESCos and towards EUCos, 
helping to reinforce their dominance (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006).  
Their unfamiliarity with ESCos has also led them to recognize EPCs as capital debt 
because they commit the customer to make repayments to the ESCo, drawn from 
savings on their energy bill. Their classification as debt has made them unattractive 
to many customers particularly during a period of economic uncertainty. In some 
cases investors were perceived to be familiar with the ESCo model but chose not to 
support them as they felt uncertain about how the energy regulatory framework 
and economy would develop over the coming years. The difficulty ESCos currently 
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face in securing finance from private sector investors is particularly damaging 
considering the decline of grant schemes in recent years.  
In relation to the influence of ESCos on institutional change, the ESCo population 
has to date exerted some important influence over how the UK regulatory 
framework has evolved. The best example of this relates to the abolishment of the 
‘28   day   rule’ in the UK. The rule allowed customers to switch supplier only four 
weeks after signing up with another supplier. It was established ‘to prevent 
incumbent suppliers from hampering new market entry by reducing the liquidity of 
the market; and to ensure that customers were not definitively locked into 
arrangements that are to their detriment’ (ESWG, 2003 p.7). In 2003, the Energy 
Services Working Group (ESWG) was established in 2003 by DTI, Ofgem and Defra 
to explore how to create an effective market for energy services in the domestic 
sector (BERR, 2007). One of their key recommendations was to relax the 28 day rule 
because suppliers were reluctant to make the necessary upfront investments 
associated with offering long-term contracts if their customers were free to leave 
within a matter of weeks, thus constraining ESCo activity (EST, 2008; ESWG, 2003; 
Smith, 2007; UKERC, 2006). After some considerable consultation, in 2007 Ofgem 
axed the 28 day rule in a move that they believed balanced   ‘improved  protection  
for  vulnerable  customers  [with]  greater  opportunities  for  innovation  in  the  market’  
(OFGEM, 2007 p.1).  
Another example of how the ESCo population has influenced regulatory change 
includes the repeal of an article within the Local Government Act 1976, prohibiting 
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local authorities (LAs) from selling electricity not generated in conjunction with heat 
(DECC, 2010a), which had traditionally posed a barrier to Local Authority led ESCos. 
Chris Huhne, then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, explained in 
2010 explained that: 
“For  too  long  Whitehall’s  dogmatic  reliance  on  ‘big’  energy  has  stood  in  the  
way  of   the  vast  potential   role  of   local  authorities   in  the  UK’s  green  energy  
revolution. Forward thinking local authorities such as Woking in Surrey (the 
owners of Thameswey ESCo) have been quietly getting on with it, but 
against  the  odds,  their  efforts  [have  been]  frustrated  by  the  law.  I’ve  taken  
the early step of overturning the ban on local authorities selling renewable 
electricity to the grid” (DECC, 2010c) 
Despite the ways in which ESCos have influenced regulation, they have on balance 
had a relatively small impact upon the regulatory landscape. For example, the ESCo 
model received minimal attention in recent white paper publications, receiving only 
a  passing  mention  in  both  the  previous  government’s 2010 Warmer Homes, Green 
Homes; A Strategy for Household Energy Management (DECC, 2010d), despite being 
referred to extensively in the preceding 2009 Heat & Energy Saving Strategy 
consultation (DECC, 2009). ESCos  also  barely  featured  in  the  current  government’s 
2012 The Future of Heating: A strategic framework for low carbon heat in the UK 
(DECC, 2012d), despite representing a business model that is well suited to the 
provision of useful energy streams such as heat. Additionally, no regulation has to 
date has been introduced with the explicit purpose of supporting ESCo activity. 
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However, the ESCo model was referred to a number of times in the impact 
assessment for the   government’s   planned Green Deal and associated Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO) for financing energy efficiency improvements (DECC, 
2011b). We discuss the potential impact of the Green Deal and ECO on the ESCo 
population in Section 7.   
6.2.3 ESCos and Technologies 
The viability of the ESCo business model is strongly influenced by the costs and 
performance of relevant energy conversion, efficiency and, where included, supply 
technologies. The costs of a number of forms of primary, secondary conversion and 
control technologies have fallen due to learning and technological advances, such 
as the cost of PV systems (Hearps and McConnell, 2011). Despite this, some 
measures are still considered too expensive to be cost-effective for ESCos, such as 
external wall insulation, which is often used to improve the energy efficiency of 
properties without wall or loft cavities. In some cases new technologies have 
entered the market, such as residential and commercial LED lighting, which have 
considerably improved the business case of energy service contracts; 
“The thing about LED lighting is that instead of saving 10 or 30%, you can 
save 80%. And then the idea of a performance guarantee finance project 
becomes very easy, because the returns are so huge you can say to the 
client I guarantee I will save you 40% of your lighting costs” (ESCo expert) 
Infrastructural constraints were also cited as an important barrier, such as the load 
capacity of district electricity distribution networks, which limits the number of PV 
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installations that can be linked to the grid on anyone line. Numerous key 
infrastructural constraints relating to District Heat (DH) networks were also 
identified, such as the technical difficulty and cost of implementing a DH network in 
a historically, densely populated area. Despite these infrastructural limitations, the 
age   and   inefficiency   of   the   UK’s   housing   stock   represents   a   large   market   for  
demand side management solutions. For example, at the start of October 2012 only 
69 per cent of properties with cavity walls were fitted with cavity wall insulation 
and only 66 per cent of properties with lofts were fitted with loft insulation (DECC, 
2012b). 
The adoption of the ESCo model has triggered some small-scale but important 
changes  to  the  UK’s  mix  of  energy  technologies,  as  well  as  its  energy  infrastructure.  
During 2011, 123,758 PV installations at or below 4kW (approximately 360,291kW 
of total capacity) were registered for the Feed-in-Tariff scheme (DECC, 2012c)14. A 
significant number of these were domestic roof-top installations, installed free-of-
charge to the consumer by ESCos, as part of energy supply contracts. The exact 
figures for total free installations are not available but A Shade Greener, a leading 
ESCo, claims to have installed nearly 21,000 free PV installations since 2010 (ASG, 
2013).  
                                                     
14 Any PV system installed after the 15th July 2009 is eligible for the FiT (Feed-in-
Tariffs Ltd, 2012) 
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In 2010, Thameswey  Energy  in  Woking  (Woking  Borough  Council’s  ESCo)  generated 
via a combination of generation technologies more than 10 Gigawatt hours (GWh) 
of low carbon electricity and 9 GWh of heat15 (e.g. CHP, PV etc) to over 170 
commercial and domestic customers (Thameswey, 2012). Another ESCo, Cofely GDF 
Suez, have installed a total of 35MW of CHP and 50km of district heating and 
cooling pipework in the UK. In Southampton alone they have are generating 40GWh 
of heat, 26GWh of electricity and 7GWh of chilled water per annum  (Cofely, 2011).  
6.2.4 ESCos and User Practices 
Technological innovation, greater GDP per capita and falling energy prices 
combined to make energy services increasingly attainable for much of the UK 
population during the 19th and 20th centuries (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006). 
However, in recent years, the high level of demand for energy services, coupled 
with significant international oil and gas price rises (DECC, 2011c) and falling real 
wages due to the economic downturn, have meant that the costs of energy services 
have increased for most domestic and commercial consumers. This has helped to 
generate additional demand for ESCos, who seek to reduce their customers’  overall  
energy costs. 
Whilst users have struggled to meet the rising costs of fulfilling their energy needs, 
the profits of the Big 6 EUCos have grown and were almost a third higher in 2010 
                                                     
15 This is enough to provide electricity and heat to approximately 2,000 households 
(Thameswey, 2012) 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
44 
 
 
than in 2008 (Consumer Focus, 2012). This has contributed to a dramatic fall in 
customers’   satisfaction   with   the   Big   6,   where only 42% of surveyed customers 
believed their EUCo’s   services represented value for money in 2011 (uSwitch, 
2011). This low-level of customer satisfaction is likely to provide added impetus for 
users to turn to alternative means of fulfilling their energy needs. 
Many user practices have begun to alter in reaction to the challenges of reducing 
carbon emissions whilst maintaining affordability, with interviewees recognising a 
significant increase in demand for environmentally sustainable products & services 
in recent years, typified by the proliferation of Corporate Social Responsibility 
commitments. Many organisations have reacted to this by seeking to engage with 
sustainable energy supply and/or demand management measures to improve the 
sustainability credentials of their customer products and/or services, with a view to 
improve their value proposition for some of their more environmentally minded 
customers. Some have consequently turned to energy service contracting as a 
means of accomplishing this,  such  as  Morrisons’  move  to  sign  an  EPC  with  EDF  to  
help reduce its total operational carbon footprint by 30% by 2020 (EDF, 2011).   
The adoption of the ESCo model has also to some extent impacted upon the 
traditional consumer-supplier dynamic in the UK, where typically energy consumers 
have merely purchased and consumed energy, and have not engaged with energy 
generation, transmission/distribution or supply. By enabling consumers to take 
responsibility for these functions and in turn, acting as energy generators and 
suppliers rather than just consumers, the ESCo model has afforded consumers the 
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opportunity to assume a significantly greater degree of control over how they 
satisfy their energy needs. Consequently, it has enabled users to adopt ways of 
satisfying their energy needs that share greater synergy with their broader set of 
objectives (e.g. supporting the local economy or alleviating fuel poverty), compared 
to those typically employed as part the prevailing consumer-supplier dynamic. The 
case of Meadows Ozone Energy Services Limited (MOZES), a community owned and 
run ESCo in Nottingham, helps to illustrate this change. Previously the residents 
were supplied by the EUCos but now they own and run a community ESCo that is 
responsible for financing, installing, operating and maintaining PV systems that 
supply them with renewable electricity via energy supply contracts. By providing 
renewable electricity to the community and reinvesting the profits from these 
supply contracts, MOZES aims to invest in additional measures capable of 
alleviating fuel poverty in the area, reducing the  community’s  carbon footprint and 
developing the local area into a space for sustainable energy technology innovation. 
The user practices of consumers that have contracted with existing ESCos, rather 
than establishing one personally, have also changed. For instance, traditionally the 
relationship between EUCos and their customers has been distant, but as part of an 
energy service contract, there is a larger degree of communication and 
collaboration between the user and the ESCo. For example, both supply and 
performance contracts often require the user to engage at the project-design stage, 
so that the ESCo designs a project which is in synthesis with their consumption 
needs and behaviours. Furthermore, EPCs often stipulate that the customer alters 
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their consumption behaviour to ensure sufficient energy savings are created to 
cover the capital costs of the project. For instance, as part of Honeywell’s EPC 
delivery, they typically employ technical measures and contractual arrangements 
that encourage their consumers to engage in more energy efficient consumption 
behaviours: “typically by getting them to participate in efficient interaction with the 
building, you can get between 6 and 10% additional savings” (ESCo manager). 
6.2.5 Competition between EUCo and ESCo business models 
Finally, we examine the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population 
and the incumbent EUCo population. EUCos have become dominant in the UK 
energy system since they emerged post-liberalisation and their dominance has 
meant they have been able to use their strong position to out-compete new 
entrants for valuable resources (e.g. financial, technical, political etc.) (Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2006). Furthermore, their influential position in the UK has meant their 
actions have both purposely and inadvertently shaped the energy industry in their 
favour, helping to cultivate a selection environment that does not penalize their 
existing business model (Wüstenhagen and Boehnke, 2008). Because ESCos and 
EUCos are characteristically distinct, they perform differently in the same selection 
environment. This helps to explain why the EUCo model has thrived and remained 
incumbent, whilst the ESCo model has merely survived in niche applications.  
The EUCo business model has become dominant in part due to increasing returns to 
its adoption (Arthur, 1989; North, 1990). Learning effects have led to a refinement 
of this model over the years, as new knowledge and skills have been acquired. 
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Adaptive expectations have meant that energy stakeholders (e.g. investors, 
policymakers, customers etc.) have become increasingly familiar with the model, 
reducing their uncertainty of it and making them more comfortable about engaging 
with it. EUCos have also benefitted from economies of scale, which means that as 
they have become larger and increasingly vertically integrated their transaction 
costs have fallen for each unit of energy they supply, helping them to become more 
cost-effective16. Lower costs have in turn attracted more customers, which has 
helped to further improve their economies of scale: 
“[They] all have one or 2 million customers. Their overhead costs of supply, 
billing etc. are  as  low  as  you  can  get  them…It is difficult to see how you are 
going to be able to undercut British Gas or n.Power on a cost basis” (Energy 
efficiency expert) 
The ESCo business model has not yet benefited from these types of increasing 
returns. For example, adaptive expectations are not yet relevant for the ESCo 
model, as only a limited number of potential customers are aware of the model 
(EST, 2008). However, awareness and understanding of the model are slowly being 
raised as more and more energy stakeholders come into contact with the ESCo 
model, through a small and informal social network of ESCo champions, some of 
                                                     
16 If this increase in operational scale continues unabated, the company may begin 
to suffer from the diseconomies of scale (e.g. duplication of effort, increase internal 
communication costs etc) 
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whom have worked together to promote learning and collaboration within and 
outside the energy service market niche, in order to raise  the  ESCo  model’s  profile  
and help to cultivate demand for it. This awareness raising has also been supported 
by customers who have switched to energy services and enjoyed a positive 
experience. 
The strong success of the EUCo model can also be explained by mutually 
reinforcing, coevolutionary processes that have helped to cultivate a favourable 
selection environment for EUCos but not ESCos. For instance, the introduction of 
energy supplier obligations (e.g. Energy Efficiency Commitment, Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Target, Community Energy Savings Programme), which arose out of 
necessity to reduce the GHG emissions content of EUCos’   energy   supply.  At first 
glance these obligations seem to undermine the EUCo model. For example, the 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT, running from 2008-2012) obligates all 
EUCos with a customer base of over 250,000 customers to deliver measures that 
will provide overall lifetime carbon dioxide savings of 293 MtCO2 (DECC, 2012a). 
Ofgem is able to impose a financial penalty of up to 10% of the   utility’s   annual  
turnover if it fails to achieve this target (DECC, 2010b). The EUCos are expected to 
meet this target by promoting the uptake of energy efficiency or low carbon energy 
solutions to their domestic customers17.  
                                                     
17 Monies raised from these obligations have to some extent been redistributed by 
government to support ESCo activity, predominantly via capital grants. For 
example, Aberdeen Heat & Power has received funding from both CERT & CESP.  
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Whilst these obligations include no provision that requires EUCos’   revenue to be 
coupled with the volume of gas and electricity units they sell, they have neither 
encouraged nor mandated the EUCos to fundamentally change their business 
model. This liberalised regulatory framework has therefore not only enabled these 
companies to continue to operate their business model as usual but also in a way 
that remains continues to generate profit. This has helped them to retain their 
current levels of political power and wealth in the UK and in turn afforded them the 
opportunity to exert considerable influence over regulatory developments, 
primarily via political lobbying (Gkiousou, 2011; Hekkert et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2012; 
Murmann, 2003; Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008; Unruh, 2000; Wüstenhagen and 
Boehnke, 2008). For instance, both British Gas and Scottish & Southern Energy 
responded  to  DECC’s Energy Company Obligation and Green Deal consultation, with 
a specific set of recommendations to shape these regulations (Centrica, 2012b; SSE, 
2012).  
In the context of this lobbying, the latest energy supplier obligation (i.e. the Energy 
Companies Obligation (ECO) (DECC, 2011b)) continues the tradition of incorporating 
no obligation on the EUCos to fundamentally restructure their business model so 
that their revenue is no longer coupled with the sale of energy, predominantly 
sourced from fossil fuels. It is however worth noting that the ECO does go one step 
further than its predecessors by introducing a brokerage platform, which 
constitutes a market-based mechanism that allows Green Deal Providers to auction 
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future   ‘lots’ (e.g. 10,000 tonnes of carbon saving) of ECO streams Carbon Saving 
Obligation, Carbon Saving Communities and Affordable Warmth to ECO obligated 
EUCos in return for payment (DECC, 2012f). This mechanism is likely to provide the 
EUCos with an incentive to adjust their business model to provide sustainable 
energy solutions because the outputs of these schemes can be sold at a premium 
via the brokerage platform. However, we argue that this is unlikely to 
fundamentally alter their business model because it represents an optional market 
based mechanism and one that could be easily ignored given the continued 
profitability of the EUCo model in the UK (Consumer Focus, 2012). These examples 
help to illustrate how the political strength of the EUCo population has helped to 
shape regulatory responses that avoid undermining the effectiveness of their 
business model. However, as we discuss in the next section, a number of the Big 6 
EUCos are beginning to experiment with offering ESCo-type contracts, although 
their core business continues to be aligned the EUCo model. 
In summary, recent UK energy system developments have begun to positively alter 
the  ESCos’  selection  environment, helping to improve the ESCo model’s degree of 
fitness. However, many factors continue to inhibit ESCo activity and reinforce the 
dominance of the EUCos. 
7 Future coevolution of ESCo business model with UK energy system 
We now discuss how the adoption of the ESCo model is beginning to cause changes 
to other elements of the business model population, and how its adoption may 
coevolve with changes in the wider UK energy system in the future. This should 
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provide insight into how ESCos are likely to evolve and their potential to help shape 
a low-carbon transition.   
7.1 Changes to the business model population 
7.1.1 Changes to the EUCo Business Model 
The emergence of the ESCo model in the UK is beginning to affect change in the 
business models of a number of incumbent businesses, including the EUCos. Five of 
the six major EUCo companies were found to have recently delivered demand 
and/or supply side energy service contracts to their customers. Of these, 3 EUCos 
offered both demand and supply side energy services, although their core business 
remains the sale of units of energy. For example, EDF has recently signed an EPC 
contract with the supermarket Morrisons, guaranteeing £1 million worth of energy 
savings per year across its stores (EDF, 2011). EDF also currently hold a 34% stake in 
Dalkia, one   of   the   world’s   leading   providers   of   energy   supply   contracts   for   heat  
provision. This example illustrates that even despite the continued profitability of 
the EUCo model (Consumer Focus, 2012) that some EUCos have begun to diversify 
their business portfolio by developing energy services divisions or acquiring shares 
in ESCos.  
Interviewees working for the EUCos explained that they had adopted aspects of the 
ESCo model because they regarded energy service contracting as an effective 
means of adding value to their service propositions, which could help them to gain 
competitive advantage over their competitors and grow their market share. In 
contrast to the past situation, where the regulatory environment has so far helped 
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to stabilise the EUCo model, some respondents explained that the EUCos 
acknowledged that a period of accelerated energy system change was underway, 
which posed a long-term threat to the viability of their traditional business model. 
They highlighted factors such as the introduction of a low-carbon regulation, 
changing customer demand, rising energy prices etc. Their entrance into the energy 
service market was evidence of restructuring their business model so that they 
could take advantage of this change, as opposed to being a potential victim of it, as 
argued in a speech by the CEO of Centrica, owners of British Gas: 
“Within a few years, we want energy services to be just as big a part of 
British   Gas   as   energy   supply…Indeed   as   I   see   it,   the   old   utility   business  
model   is   dead…It   is   my   belief   that   the   energy   company   model   we   know  
today will, within this decade, seem just as much a thing of the past as the 
Gas Light and Coke Company. And from where I stand, I can already see it 
happening” (Sam Laidlaw, 2010) 
7.1.2 New entrants to the energy services market 
The greater accessibility of the ESCo business model compared to the EUCo model 
means that some organisations, not traditionally engaged in energy provision, have 
entered the energy market by offering energy service contracts. These have 
included organisations such as local authorities (e.g. Woking Borough Council, 
Aberdeen City Council), property developers (e.g. Galliford Try, Willmot Dixon), 
equipment manufacturers (e.g. Honeywell, Siemens) and facilities management 
companies (e.g. Mitie, Amey).  
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Alongside this influx of new entrants practicing the ESCo model, there have also 
emerged a number of new actor partnerships between a range of public, private 
and third sector organisations. Some of these have taken the form of joint-venture 
ESCos, such as the Birmingham Energy Savers ESCo developed by Birmingham City 
Council and Birmingham Environmental Partnership (a Local Strategic Partnership 
which serves deliver a better quality of life in Birmingham) (BEP, 2012), whilst 
others have taken the form of contractual agreements, such as between Cofely and 
Southampton City Council. Many of these partnerships have emerged as a means of 
pooling  the  different  organisations’  resources  and  capabilities,  in  order  to  deliver  a  
more successful energy service project. This trend seems likely to continue into the 
future. 
7.1.3 Future Variation of the ESCo Population 
In view of the above developments, it is expected that the ESCo population will 
remain heterogeneous, partly because replication of business models is normally 
imperfect (Murmann, 2003), either due to accident, experiment or design (Hodgson 
and Knudsen, 2004), serving to introduce additional variation to the population. A 
high degree of variation is also expected to persist because of the heterogeneity of 
the adopting   firms   and   their   partners’   objectives.   Furthermore,   the   ESCos’  
customer base has a heterogeneous set of needs. This is likely to encourage a 
variety of ESCos to emerge in order to satisfy this variety of organisational and 
customer requirements: 
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“There are very large, sophisticated, multisided, multi-International or national 
companies and then you get smaller, medium-sized commercial buildings…  
[there are] different ESCos to meet different requirements” (ESCo Director)  
Variation will be moderated as some ESCos fall victim to selection pressures and are 
consequently disbanded, as has happened previously (e.g. London ESCo, Caithness 
Heat & Power). Variant failures, coupled with learning effects (see Section 6.2.5) 
may lead to one or more ESCo variants becoming dominant, analogous with 
dominant technological designs (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Additionally, variation is 
likely to be moderated by the introduction of standardized energy service contracts, 
as outlined in Article 14 of the European Energy Efficiency Directive (EU, 2012). 
These will help to make replication more accurate and thus limit the scale of 
replicative imperfections (i.e. in the sense of copying errors from generation to 
generation of ESCos). Taking these factors into account we expect the degree of 
variation in ESCo population to remain broadly similar and as such, the type of 
influence this population exerts on the wider UK energy system to also remain 
similar. 
7.2 Future coevolutionary interactions   
Taking into account emerging developments, the evidence suggests that over the 
coming years the fitness of the ESCo model within its selection environment should 
continue to improve. This is likely to encourage growth in the ESCo population and 
increase the causal influence they have on the evolution of the wider UK energy 
system. The continuing and potentially worsening effects of climate change are 
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likely to help support a sympathetic selection environment for the ESCo model, for 
example by exerting pressure on government to develop and maintain a supportive 
regulatory framework that support GHG emissions reductions. Energy insecurity is 
expected to worsen as the  UK’s finite fossil fuel reserves are steadily depleted and 
existing generation facilities are retired (DECC and OFGEM, 2011). This in 
conjunction with increased global demand for energy are likely to have an impact 
on energy prices, which are expected to continue to rise (DECC, 2011a). High energy 
prices coupled with projections of very modest economic growth for the UK in 2013 
and 2014 (IMF, 2013) means consumer demand for a reduction in energy bills is 
likely to remain high, consequently making energy service contracting more 
attractive. In particular, public sector organisations are likely to take measures to 
reduce their energy costs in order to reduce their overheads in reaction to public 
sector cutbacks, which have resulted from the economic downturn. 
The institutional change that is likely to most strongly influence the selection or 
otherwise of the ESCo model in the next few years is the introduction of the Green 
Deal, which came into operation in Autumn 2012. It constitutes a financial 
mechanism that eliminates the need for householders to pay upfront for 
sustainable energy supply (e.g. PV panels) and/or energy demand management 
measures (e.g. loft insulation) as these are covered by the savings they will 
generate on the customer’s  energy bill in the future (DECC, 2012e). As part of the 
Green Deal, a Green Deal Provider will be responsible for identifying, designing, 
installing,  financing  and  servicing  a  suite  of  energy  solutions  in  the  resident’s  home,  
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the  cost  of  which  it  recuperates  via  the  cost  savings  they  generate  on  the  resident’s  
energy bill. Consequently, Green Deal Providers will operate much like ESCos. 
The key benefit of the Green Deal is likely to be that it will help to open up the 
residential market to ESCos, which they have traditionally struggled to harness. This 
is because it puts in place the necessary legal framework to allow for the cost of the 
measures to be repaid via  the  customer’s  energy  bill  by  attaching  their  costs  to  the 
property, not the householder. Therefore, even if the house is sold, the new 
householder will continue to pay off the costs of the measures to the Green Deal 
Provider. It was also considered by a number of interviewees that in light of the 
Green Deal, many financial institutions are likely to be more forthcoming with 
finance to fund residential EPCs than at present given these legal provisions and the 
added context of government support for this type of contracting. For instance, the 
Green Deal Finance Company has recently been set up to provide an affordable 
source of finance to Green Deal Providers (GDFC, 2012).  
Despite the potential boost the Green Deal may provide ESCos, concerns were 
raised that it may not have the desired impact the government is hoping for, in part 
because attaching the debt from the cost of the energy measures to the property 
could make it difficult for the householder to sell their home, making it undesirable: 
“You are taking it on as a debt and you are forcing anybody who comes in 
and buys the property to take on that debt, that long-term obligation as 
well…I   don't   think   it   will   be   attractive   to   a   mainstream   property   owner” 
(ESCo Manager) 
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Furthermore, the Green Deal is an optional scheme and some interviewees were 
concerned that if either households or providers did not consider the Green Deal to 
be sufficiently attractive they would not engage with it. It was expected that the 
extent to which customers will take up the Green Deal is likely to depend largely 
upon the implicit interest rate being charged by the Green Deal Provider and thus 
the  scale  of  the  customer’s  cost  savings:   
“So you are creating a structure where capital is being invested and the 
interest can be repaid. That doesn't mean that...people are going to rush out 
and do it” (ESCo Expert) 
Under the Green Deal,  a  proportion  of  the  savings  on  the  customer’s  energy  bill  are  
repaid to the Green Deal Provider via the customer’s  EUCo bill. Consequently, in 
most cases, units of electricity and gas will continue to be provided to the customer 
by a EUCo. In this sense, the Green Deal reserves a role for the EUCos and the EUCo 
business model as savings are repaid via the contracts the EUCos share with their 
customers. Therefore, unless the EUCos engage in the scheme as a Green Deal 
Provider, they are unlikely to overhaul their business model in accordance with this 
policy. 
Other developments that are likely to support ESCo growth include the 
establishment of the Green Investment Bank, which is likely to help make finance 
more freely available for ESCos, given that the funding priorities of this body are set 
to include support for the Green Deal, non-domestic energy efficiency and energy 
from waste generation (BIS, 2011). Additionally, the Renewable Heat Incentive will 
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provide generators of small to medium scale low-carbon heat with a financial 
incentive similar to the FiT, in turn supporting the business case of ESCos looking to 
provide heat as part of energy supply contracts. Finally, the recent European Energy 
Efficiency Directive (EU, 2012) obligates EU member states to set their own energy 
savings targets, which is likely to encourage EU members to consider energy service 
contracting as a means of meeting their targets. Additionally, the Directive makes 
provision for member states to support energy service market growth by making 
lists of providers and model contracts available, which is likely to reduce the 
amount of time and money currently spent involved in developing service contracts 
from new. 
Continued technological innovation could also play an important role in supporting 
ESCo activity, as incremental innovations and learning processes help to improve 
the cost-effectiveness of energy conversion and control equipment. Additionally, 
the articulation of visions and expectations associated with technological 
innovations will help to reduce consumers’ scepticism of innovative technologies 
often utilised by ESCos. However, a different set of technological innovations could 
have a negative impact on ESCos. For example, the process of hydraulic fracturing, 
or  ‘fracking’,  has  made  vast  reserves  of  shale  gas  available  for  extraction  that  were  
not accessible before. These reserves could be utilised in place of renewable 
sources of energy, helping to reinforce the dominance of the fossil fuel oriented 
EUCos (Stevens, 2012). 
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Positive feedbacks are also likely to help support growth of the ESCo population. 
Any growth of the ESCo market could serve to further support the EUCos’ belief 
that the energy system is not only undergoing radical change but also that the ESCo 
model is likely to play an important role in the future, potentially encouraging 
EUCos to further develop their energy service portfolio. However, although the UK 
EUCos have exhibited some degree of movement towards the ESCo model, it is 
difficult to ascertain how sweeping this change may be going forward because 
EUCos continue to generate extremely healthy profits from operating their 
traditional business model (Consumer Focus, 2012). This presents a persuasive 
argument to shareholders and board members to continue with their traditional 
business model. 
“People are sitting there making  money   on   those   contracts…The   innovation  
models say you should innovate and change but the reality of life is that 
people don't most of the time because [they] are making money” (ESCo 
Director) 
Another example of a positive feedback cycle that could support ESCo growth arises 
from the idea of adaptive expectations (Arthur, 1989; North, 1990), where more 
widespread adoption of the ESCo model will help to raise its profile amongst other 
actors and in turn improve their understanding of it. Taking financial institutions as 
an example, we can see how these institutions may be more willing to provide 
ESCos with finance if they become more aware of their existence and have possess 
a clearer understanding of how the ESCo model functions.   
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In summary, we anticipate that the ESCo model’s  degree  of fitness with its selection 
environment will improve in the future. Although much of this change will be a 
consequence of developments beyond the control of ESCos, some is likely to be 
attributable to ESCo related positive feedbacks. Even so, many of the significant 
barriers identified in Section 6.2 are likely to remain, potentially continuing to limit 
ESCo operation to niche deployment.  
8 Conclusions 
This paper developed an analytical framework integrating analysis of business 
models (Osterwalder & Pigneur, (2010) and co-evolution (Foxon, 2011), and applied 
it to analyse the development of the Energy Service Company (ESCo) business 
model in the UK. This approach sought to address two questions: Firstly, why has 
the ESCo model traditionally been confined to niche applications?  Secondly, what 
role is the ESCo model likely to play in the future transition to a low-carbon UK 
energy system?   
In relation to the first question, this paper indicates that ESCos’  failure to proliferate 
can largely be attributed to a hostile selection environment, which has traditionally 
been unsupportive of energy service contracting. Furthermore, we find that the 
poor fitness of the ESCo model with its selection environment can to some extent 
be attributed to the dominance of the EUCo model and the coevolutionary 
relationship EUCos share with the wider energy system. We find that positive 
feedbacks between the EUCos and the wider energy system have helped to 
cultivate a selection environment that is supportive of EUCo operation but not the 
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application of the ESCo model. This dynamic has contributed to a ‘locking in’ of the 
EUCo model and consequently, the marginalisation of the ESCo model. 
Considering the second question, we expect ESCos’   influence   on   energy   system  
change to increase in magnitude over the coming years as the current emergence 
of a more favourable selection environment is likely to support future uptake and 
operation of the ESCo model. Additionally, variation within the ESCo population is 
expected to remain broadly similar to that at present, as forces encouraging 
standardisation of ESCo business models are balanced by the heterogeneous nature 
of energy service contracts. Thus, we envision that any future changes to the UK 
energy system that can be attributed to ESCo activity are likely to be qualitatively 
similar to those that have occurred in the past, although we expect that these are 
likely to occur on a larger scale as the ESCo population grows larger. Most 
interestingly, we observe that the incumbent EUCos have reacted to the changing 
selection environment by developing their own ESCo divisions, perhaps signalling a 
transformation of the UK energy sector’s status quo.  
Proliferation of ESCos and consequently their growing influence on energy system 
change is also likely to be attributable to coevolutionary positive feedbacks. Here, 
ESCo induced changes to the energy system are likely to help cultivate a more 
sympathetic selection environment for ESCos, in turn encouraging ESCo growth and 
thus amplifying their effect on the energy system. This would see ESCos benefitting 
from similar feedback mechanisms to those that have helped the EUCos to 
dominate the UK energy system.  
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In conclusion, the empirical evidence indicates that ESCos could play an increasingly 
important role in a low-carbon transition of the UK energy system, as suggested in 
some scenarios. However, this role is not assured because numerous key barriers 
still remain that continue to constrain ESCo growth,   particularly   customers’  
unfamiliarity with the model and financial organisations’ perception of it as a higher 
risk business model than the conventional EUCo model. Additionally, unforeseen 
future perturbations in the energy system, such as a radical change to energy 
policy, could jeopardise growth in the ESCo market and ensure the ESCo model 
remains confined to niche applications.  
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Key Partners 
Network of 
suppliers and 
partners that 
make business 
model work 
Key Activities 
Most important 
things a 
company does 
to make its 
business model 
work 
Value 
Proposition 
The bundle of 
products and 
services that 
create value for 
a specific 
Customer 
Segment 
Customer 
Relationships 
Relationships a 
company 
establishes with 
its Customer 
Segments 
Customer 
Segments 
The different 
groups of 
people or 
organizations 
an enterprise 
aims to reach 
and serve 
Key Resources 
Most important 
assets required 
to make the 
business model 
work  
Channels 
How a company 
communicates 
with and reaches 
its Customer 
Segments 
Cost Structure 
All cost incurred to operate a business model 
Revenue Streams 
The money a company generates from each 
Customer Segment 
 
Table 1
Business Model 
Building Blocks 
Energy Service Company (ESCo) Model  Energy Utility Company (EUCo) Model  
Customer Value 
Proposition 
 
- Fulfil energy needs at a similar or lower cost to EUCo model 
- ESCo assumes most financial and technical risk of fulfilling customer’s  
energy needs 
- Bespoke   and   holistic   energy   solutions   that   closely   fit   the   customer’s  
needs 
- Energy needs met with fewer adverse environmental effects 
compared to EUCo model, meaning customer can enjoy more 
sustainable lifestyle, fulfil regulatory and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) obligations etc. 
- Societal benefits (e.g. alleviation of fuel poverty, climate change 
mitigation, localization of capital flows) 
- Fulfil energy needs at low cost  
- Reliable energy supply 
- Short-term contracts mean flexibility for customer 
- Little  interference  with  customer  as  they  do  not  go  ‘beyond  the  meter’  
e.g. few behavioural stipulations 
  
Target 
Customer 
- Mainly commercial (focus on public sector), with some residential and 
industrial  
- Residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural  
Table 2
Customer 
Channels 
- On-line, TV, telephone, postal & door-to-door marketing, purchasing, 
metering, billing & customer feedback 
- Energy supplied via localized and often private distribution networks 
- Support via on-going customer interaction & project management  
- On-line, TV, telephone, postal & door-to-door marketing, purchasing, 
metering, billing & customer feedback 
- Energy supplied via a national transmission & distribution network 
- Support via customer service call centre, metering & billing etc. 
Customer 
Relationship 
 
- Bespoke & holistic  
- Long-term service contracts 
- Close, cooperative, candid and trusting relationship to ensure 
customer’s  and  ESCo’s  needs  are  met 
- Customer may invest in ESCo  
- Customer may manage ESCo (e.g. Community ESCo) 
- Impersonal & standardised  
- Short-term supply contracts 
- Customer responsible for managing most conversion processes (e.g. 
gas to heat via boiler) 
Key Activities 
 
Energy Supply Contracts (ESCs) & Energy Performance Contracts 
(EPCs)1 
- Typically finance, design, build, operate and maintain small to medium 
scale demand management & low carbon supply energy projects 
- EUCos typically engage in energy generation and supply. They may 
also engage in distribution and transmission but this is less common: 
Generation - Finance, design, build, operate and maintain large-scale, 
centralised energy generation & distribution infrastructure 
                                                     
1 A detailed description of both ESCs & EPCs provided below this table 
ESCs  
- Energy generation, distribution, supply, metering and billing  
Supply - Electricity trading and metering & billing of energy supply. 
Rarely   go   ‘beyond   the   meter’.   Some   installation   &   maintenance   of  
small-scale conversion and control technologies (e.g. central heating)  
Distribution & Transmission - Within their vertically integrated 
organisation, some EUCos may engage in transmission and distribution 
via arms-length transmission and distribution network operators (i.e. 
TNOs & DNOs) 
EPCs  
- Preliminary and investment grade auditing 
- Measurement and verification of energy savings  
Key Resources 
 
ESCs & EPCs 
- Financial resources and technical, financial and legal expertise to 
develop small to medium scale demand management and low-carbon 
supply energy projects.  
- Customer facing services i.e. operation and maintenance, billing etc. 
- Financial resources and technical, financial and legal expertise to 
develop large-scale, centralised generation and distribution 
infrastructure 
- Customer facing services i.e. nationwide metering, billing and 
customer service network 
- Fossil fuels (e.g. gas, coal) 
- Centralised generation & distribution technologies  
ESCs 
- Technology: Decentralised, primary conversion technologies (i.e. 
generation) & distribution technologies 
- Fuel 
EPCs  
- Technology: Secondary conversion equipment and building controls 
Key 
Partnerships 
 
- Financial Institutions & Investors 
- Technical, Legal & Financial Consultancies 
- Property Developers 
- Sub-Contractors  
- Local Authorities 
- Financial Institutions & Investors 
- Electrical Power Generation Companies  
- Transmission & Distribution Network Operators  
- Gas & Electricity Network Regulators 
Revenue 
Streams 
 
ESCs & EPCs 
- Bank finance 
- Capital grants  
- Customer investment 
- Bank finance 
- Sale of metered units of delivered energy (e.g. gas, imported 
electricity) 
- Low-carbon financial incentives (e.g. Renewables Obligation 
Certificates) 
- Trading of surplus electricity on the market 
ESCs  
- Customer payment for useful energy streams (e.g. hot water). 
Customer covers this cost in part via energy savings ESCo achieves 
through efficiency gains or utilisation of cheaper primary energy input 
- Low-carbon financial incentives for micro-generation (e.g. FiT, RHI)  
EPCs 
- Payment for predefined quality & quantity of final energy services 
(e.g. light). Customer covers this via energy savings the ESCo achieves 
through efficiency gains 
Cost Structure 
 
EPCs & ESCs 
- Staff and contractors to implement projects 
- Marketing and communication 
- Operation & maintenance of infrastructure 
- Finance or investment repayments   
- Technical, financial and legal consultancy 
- Similar costs to ESCos barring costs specific to EPCs  
ESCs  
- Acquiring the rights from gatekeeper organisations provide ESCs (e.g. 
property developer) 
- Metering & billing 
- Generation technology and/or wholesale purchase of energy 
- Fuel 
- Premises & land acquisition for generation 
EPCs  
- Measurement & Verification of savings 
- Compensation for poor missing energy performance targets 
 
Figure 1
Figure 2 
